Challenges in building partner capacity:  Civil-military relations in the United States and new democracies by Bruneau, Thomas
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2015
Challenges in building partner capacity: 
Civil-military relations in the United
States and new democracies
Bruneau, Thomas
Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2015, Vol. 26, No. 3, 429-445, bttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.982880
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44928

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2015 
Vol. 26, No. 3, 429-445, bttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2014.982880 
Challenges in building partner capacity: Civil-military 
relations in the United States and new democracies 
Thomas Bruneau* 
Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California, USA 
(Received JO December 2013; accepted 19 August 2014) 
The main emphasis in US security assistance is 'building partner capacity'. 
To understand prospects for building capacity implies knowledge of the 
security sector, including the armed forces and also national police and 
intelligence agencies. The scholarly sub-discipline that should be useful for 
analysis of a nation's use of armed forces is civil-military relations as it 
ostensibly directs attention to when and how civilians choose to utilize their 
nation's armed forces. The goal in this article is to further refine the field of 
civil-military relations by focusing attention on two main concepts -
democratic civilian control and strategy - and discussing their relevance in 
the context of building partner capacity. 
Keywords: Afghanistan; Clausewitz; Iraq; civil-military relations; private 
security contractors; partner capacity; ROTC program 
Introduction 
In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama stated that 'Our 
military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign 
counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties 
with a broad range of goveminents.' 1 On 5 January 2012, President Obama 
proclaimed defense strategic guidance that emphasizes building partner capacity. 
As a Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report states, 'The new guidance 
makes extensive use of the word "partnership" calling repeatedly for continued 
efforts to work with, and build the capacity of, U.S. allies and partners.' 2 The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted at least two studies on 
the capability of various agencies in the US government to build partner capacity, 
and recommends best practices to achieve this goal.3 There have been 
hearings on this topic at the Committee on Armed Services, US House of 
Representatives.4 The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, released on 4 March 
2014, uses the term partner or partnership 115 times, plus another 11 referring to 
building capacity in these partners or partnerships.5 Towards this end, of building 
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partner capacity, already in fiscal year 2012 the US government appropriated 
more than $529 million for a dozen programs designed to achieve this overall 
goal.6 
However, while several official documents, congressional hearings, and the 
GAO reports invoke the mantra of 'building partner capacity', and analyze the 
requirements for the US government to implement it, the author has found 
nothing on the nature of civil-military relations and national security and 
defense in the partner countries that would facilitate or impede the US efforts. This 
information could be particularly important for the officers and enlisted personnel 
working in the Security Cooperation Offices in the combatant commands and in-
country, who have primary responsibility to implement programs to build partner 
capacity.7 
The argument in this article is that the situation of civil-military relations in 
the United States is unique, and the fundamental core of this uniqueness is 
unquestioned civilian control; meanwhile, in the vast majority of new 
democracies civilian control is problematic, and these , countries lack the 
institutional bases for its effective exercise. To analyze this issue the author will 
use the concepts of democratic civilian control and strategy. A key element of 
capacity building is strategy formulation. However, strategy formulation is not 
the same as implementation. To assess the ability of the United States to 
implement a strategy, the author will look at the most important recent experience 
of the United States - the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq - and, drawing on several 
credible sources, conclude that there was no strategy. To illustrate the importance 
of this gap, the author will then examine thegrowth of the private security 
companies, and their negative impact on the war effort.8 
This article is possible now as authoritative accounts have recently been 
published in the United States that demonstrate what is really involved in 
decisions on the use of the armed forces by this country. The author draws on his 
experience since 1974 in conducting seminars and research on civil-military 
relations in new democracies on four continents. 
The experience of the United States 
To understand contemporary US civil-military relations one must focus initially 
on the political institutions developed over time to exercise democratic civilian 
control. With the founding of the American republic at the end of the eighteenth 
century there was indeed concern about establishing and guaranteeing 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces, largely based on the colonial 
experience. This experience included the British legacy with a standing army and 
the actions of a militia turned revolutionary army under the leadership of General 
George Washington. Consequently, there is extensive guidance regarding civil-
military relations in the very succinct US Constitution of 1787. Eleven of the 
eighteen separate paragraphs specifying the powers of the Congress, in Article I, 
deal with the armed forces and security. 9 Between the late eighteenth century and 
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today the United States has created a vast array of institutions, which in all cases 
are directed by civilians, to ensure the control of the armed forces. As President 
Obama invoked as necessary when he relieved General McChrystal of command 
in Afghanistan; 'strict adherence to the military chain of command and respect 
for civilian control over that chain of command' .10 
Among the most basic institutions for controlling the armed forces in the 
United States are those concerning budgets, promotions, and professional 
military education. That is, the trinity of money, careers, and culture. Together 
they constitute the fundamental elements of democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces as routinely practiced in the United States. 11 
The main institutional components of the budget process include, in the 
executive, both the Office of Management and Budget and agencies within 
the Department of Defense. In the Congress they include the authorizing 
and appropriating committees of both houses. There is extensive oversight 
conducted by the executive with inspectors general and by Congress with oversight 
committees, the GAO, Congressional Budget Office, CRS, and specialized 
inspectors general such as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR). 
The three military services have responsibility for recruiting, organizing, 
training,.and equipping the military. Military promotions begin with boards of 
military personnel, but the recommended promotions are then vetted by the 
military and civilian leadership within the Department of Defense, passed on to 
the President, and finally approved by the US Senate. In sum, the responsibility 
for promotions is shared among the military services themselves, the executive, 
and the Congress. The 'precepts', which define the numbers and priorities for the 
military promotion boards, are stipulated by the civilian service secretaries of the 
separate services. These secretaries, down to the level of assistant secretaries, are 
nominated by the President and approved, or not, by the Senate. 
Military education is also a shared responsibility, but ultimately civilians 
decide on everything. Each branch of the military, to include the Coast Guard and 
the Merchant Marine, has service academies, at Annapolis, Colorado Springs, 
West Point, New London, and Kings' Point as well as intermediate and senior 
staff or war colleges. Funding is provided in the same manner as discussed above, 
and the Congress can impose, as it did in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, new priorities in military education; in this specific 
case, joint professional military education (JPME). The individual members of 
Congress nominate the individuals who will attend the three service academies, 
which ensures both regional and political diversity. The service academy degrees 
are accredited by regional accreditation bodies, which are composed over-
whelmingly of civilian academics. Only a minority of officers, less than 20%, 
attend the service academies. A majority of commissioned officers enter through 
the Reserve Officer Training Program (ROTC). The ROTC program is funded by 
way of scholarships from the US government that enable civilian institutions to 
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support the education of these future officers. And, even if the executive branch 
manages education at the academies, and the ROTC program, no individual 
becomes an officer, or increases in rank without the advice and consent of the US 
Senate. 
In short, following from the basis set forth in the US Constitution of 1787, the 
United States has developed over the past 227 years a comprehensive set of 
institutions ensuring democratic civilian control that are ingrained in the thinking 
of the US military, and all of civil society, and foremost in the political decision-
makers. The US media, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations are 
extremely active in highlighting any real or imagined independence of the 
military. 
That the US population is aware of civilian control is very clear in an October 
2011 Pew Research Center public opinion survey, which shows that whereas the 
military is the most highly regarded institution in the United States, which the 
study states is the only institution in the US survey showing an increase in 
confidence since the beginning of their surveys in the 1970s, the population 
doesn't hold the military responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The public makes a sharp distinction in its view of military service members and the 
wars they have been fighting. More than nine-in-ten express pride in the troops and 
three-quarters say they thanked someone in the military. But, a 45% plurality says 
neither of the post-9/11 wars has been worth the cost and only a quarter say they are 
following news of the wars closely. And, half of the public say the wars have made 
little difference in their lives. 12 
The results of the survey validate that civilians, and not the military, make the 
decisions on the use of force in the United States. 
In late 2013 and early 2014 two authoritative books were published which·' 
provide tremendous insights into decision-making in national security and defense. 
in the United States, and on civil-military relations. Both of them make it· 
abundantly clear that democratic civilian control, at the level of the executive and : 
the Congress, is not at question in the United States. For example, in his Days of', 
Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House, Peter Baker, in discussing 'the surge' in . ·· 
Iraq states: 'Within weeks, the president who had boasted of deferring to the 
military had swept aside the leaders of the war effort.' 13 Note that the term Baker 
uses is 'deferring,' which suggests that it was the President's choice to pay 
attention to military advice, or not. Robert Gates, in explaining why he relieved 
General McKieman, Commander in Afghanistan, which was the first time a 
wartime commander had been relieved since President Truman fired General 
Douglas MacArthur, states: 'I hope that the McKieman episode will contribute to 
reestablishing accountability for senior officers for wartime performance, 
including the precedent that personal misconduct or serious mistakes need not 
be required for relief.' 14 The Secretary of Defense fired a senior four star general 
not because of any particular flaw or mistake, but because the civilian Secretary 
had lost confidence in the general's ability to conduct the war. Or, in Gates's 
discussing his developing a sense of the military's perspectives regarding 'Don't 
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ask, Don't tell', he states: 'the military never gets a "vote" on what it must do, and I 
was not advocating anything like a plebiscite.' 15 And, if there remains any doubt, 
Gates elaborates at length demonstrating that civilian control, in this case exercised 
by two very different presidents, is simply not a question in the United States: 
At the end of 2006, Bush overruled the field commander, the chairman and all the 
Joint Chiefs, and the Middle East and Central Asia regional (Centcom) commander 
in ordering the surge. He replaced the secretary of defense, the Centcom 
commander, and the field commander essentially at the same time. The war in Iraq 
was going badly, and he acted courageously and boldly to change course. Obama 
similarly acted courageously and boldly at the end of 2009 when he ordered the 
Afghan surge, the impetus for which came from the military. In so doing, Obama 
overruled the policy and domestic political concerns of his vice president and 
virtually all of the senior White House staff. Then, contrary to the advice of his 
generals, he imposed timelines to avoid the impression (and potential reality) of 
endless war and to sustain political support in Congress and among the public. Both 
presidents were willing (at least on my watch) to replace commanders they thought 
were not succeeding. 1 
In sum, based on a vast array of institutions evolving since the founding of the 
'· American republic more than two centuries ago, a culture has developed in this 
· country in which civilians occupy all the key positions in all issues of 
. governance, including national security and defense, and there is a large cadre of 
civilians who are prepared and totally comfortable in making decisions in 
· national security and defense. Consequently, civilian control of the military and 
: other security forces in the United States is not an issue. Lest there be any doubt 
on these points, since both Baker and Gates are civilians, the words of Admiral 
William J. Crowe, Jr, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide 
further support: 'In other words, like all other important decisions, those made 
about the nation's defense are fundamentally political. In any area where we 
·· spend such a vast amount of the common treasure, the questions are necessarily 
< political..i7 I think it is significant that Admiral Crowe calls attention to the scale 
of funds committed to defense in the United States. Conceivably, if the scale of 
investment were very low, as we shall see below in most new democracies, it is 
possible (but I doubt it) that the unambiguity of civilian control in the United 
States would not be so clear. As it is, large sectors of the US economy, polity, and 
society have concrete interests in defense, and in civil-military relations. A great 
many ~f the 535 members of the US Congress are interested since they either 
have military bases in their districts, and/or, defense contractors are located in 
their districts. The contractors are very active in lobbying for and bidding on 
lucrative contracts, and more generally promoting a focus on issues on national 
security and defense. And, even if there is an all-volunteer force, resulting in only 
0.5% of the population in the armed forces, there are large and active associations 
of retired service personnel and lobbying groups promoting interest in issues 
concerning the armed forces. 18 In sum, national security and defense are 
important issues for important sectors. What is not in question is civilian control 
of the armed forces. 19 
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The challenge to establish democratic civilian control in new democracies 
The challenge of asserting democratic civilian control over the armed forces and 
security forces in new democracies is ongoing, and not only for the extreme cases 
of military coups, if we but recall the admonition of Samuel E. Finer in his classic 
The Man on Horseback when he states, 'Instead of asking why the military 
engage in politics, we ought surely ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first 
sight the political advantages of the military vis-a-vis other and civilian groupings 
are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And, they 
possess arms.' 20 There are indeed coups including Thailand in 2006, Honduras in 
2009, Mali in 2012, Egypt, Eritrea, and Central African Republic in 2013, and the 
takeover of Russia by Vladimir Putin and the FSB since 2000.21 
The challenge of asserting democratic civilian control over the armed forces, 
and the security forces more generally, in new democracies is very difficult. That 
this is a relevant issue can be understood from two initial observations. First, in 
1974 there were a maximum of 30 democracies.22 In 2012 according to Freedom 
House, there were 118 electoral democracies out of 195 countries, or 61%.23 
Second, the SIPRI Yearbook on Military Expenditure has data on 172 countries. 
If the total number of countries today is 195, this means that only 23 lack militaries. 
Only three of which (Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama) might be considered 
important. 24 In short, most countries today are considered democracies, and the 
overwhelming majority of them have armed forces and other security forces. 
The challenge of asserting control over the armed forces and other security 
institutions is recognized as important in democratic transitions and consolida-
tion, and is the focus of a reasonable body of good analytical literature. Based on 
this literature, and our own experience in new democracies on four continents 
beginning with the Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974, we emphasize in 
our work the creation of institutions and the slowly evolving cultural support for 
these institutions. There are at least three general reasons why developing 
institutions and asserting control over the armed forces is a major challenge in 
these approximately 88 (118 less 30) new democracies.25 
First, as Philippe Schmitter, among others, demonstrates, transitions to and 
consolidation of democracy, even those in which the armed forces were not the 
government, involves a pact. Transitions do not just happen. They are negotiated 
between and among elements that hope to gain democratic control through 
elections and those who have control over the means of violence; in most cases, 
the armed forces.26 Resulting from the pacts, agreements, understandings, or 
similar formal or informal results of negotiations is a series of prerogatives that 
the armed forces retain, even as a country consolidates its democracy. This topic 
has been the productive focus in Alfred Stepan's work on South America, and the 
concept of prerogatives has also been used in a recent study by the author and a 
team focused on Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey.27 Very simply, armed forces, even 
those that are supposedly beaten and without credibility, as was the case in 
Argentina after the Malvinas fiasco in 1982, are able to negotiate a series of 
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prerogatives which obviate control by democratically elected civilians over 
sectors of economy, society, and specifically the armed forces. These may 
include a continuing role in economic areas such as civil aviation (Brazil), 
logging and mining (Indonesia), and the economy (Egypt and Russia). In society 
they may include continuing special status with unique laws and courts for 
members of the armed forces (Brazil). And, in specific military areas, the most 
common, and long-lasting, are continuing military control of intelligence and 
professional military education. 28 
Second, civilian control over the armed forces is impossible without a wide 
variety of new or radically changed institutions whereby effective control can be 
exercised by civilians. In most cases, there are legacy laws and institutions from 
the previous non-democratic regimes. These can include laws that prevent 
specialization by civilians in national security and defense, as is currently the 
case, for example, in Argentina and Nepal. Or the lack of a career in defense, as is 
the case in most new democracies. Or differential pay for civilians in a ministry of 
defense compared to other ministries, which was the case in Colombia. 
Everywhere, a minimal element is a civilian-led ministry of defense. There must 
also be a system, such as a supreme audit institution (SAi) to 'follow the money'. 
Also required is a series of committees in a legislature to keep track of such issues 
as military recruitment and participation in international peacekeeping missions. 
And, also required is a set of institutions in the executive and the legislative 
branches to control military intelligence.29 It is extremely difficult in new 
democracies that face resource scarcities and institutional challenges in general to 
create these new institutions focused on the armed forces. The tendency is to 'let 
sleeping dogs lie'. The superb book by Narcis Serra recounts his herculean efforts 
during nine years as Minister of Defense of Spain in creating the institutions for 
democratic civilian control of the armed forces. And, it must be noted, Serra's 
experience was in the context of NATO and the EU, which facilitated his efforts 
through external requirements for entry and ongoing funding and other support. 
No similar set of incentives for establishing these institutions exists in other areas 
of the world. Serra, who uses a comparative approach, calls attention again and 
again to the propensity in Latin America for institutions to be created on paper, but 
not in reality. The same propensity for laws without implementation is pervasive 
throughout most of the world of new democracies. 30 
Third, a commonplace phrase is 'you don't know what you don't know'. In the 
case of the armed forces, security, and defense, it is easy to comprehend why 
civilians - either elected or those appointed by elected officials - would initially 
know very little about national security and defense. In the prior, non-democratic, 
regimes there was minimal scope or opportunity for civilians to become 
knowledgeable about these issues. And, it could have been very dangerous to 
express any interest in them. Then, with the transitions/consolidation, unless there 
is a bureaucracy, with positions and salaries, there is no motivation or incentives 
for civilians to learn about these issues. And, in most cases with which I am 
familiar, the military themselves are loath to provide this information. After all, 
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knowledge is power, and if the military can maintain a monopoly on this kind of 
information, then their relative power increases. Consequently, and I have seen this 
situation 20 years after transitions in all of the world but for the NATO/EU area.31 
The combination of these three factors has resulted in a situation in virtually 
all of the newer democracies where real, vs. formalistic or rhetorical, control of 
democratically elected civilians over the armed forces and other security forces 
has not been achieved. There are few and weak institutions, and minimal cultural 
support for democratic civilian control among the civilian elites, society in 
general, and the armed forces themselves. In most cases, this is not particularly 
important domestically, however, as little is expected of the armed forces other 
than that they do not publicly oppose the elected civilian leaders or attempt to 
stage a coup. 32 In the majority of cases in new democracies, the amount of funds, 
as measured as a percentage of GDP, is minimal. Taking an arbitrary sample of 
five newer and five older democracies, I found the average of 0.92% of GDP in 
2013 for Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa vs. 1.44% of 
GDP for Australia, Canada, France, Japan, and the Netherlands. That is, the 
former are 63% of tlle latter, although the former countries are thought to be more 
important in their regions than tlle latter. The United States, where defense is 
3.30% of GDP is excluded.33 In contrast, and again using Jane's Defence 
Budgets, and examining the same five countries in each category, whereas 
personnel costs in the former are 65% of total defense budgets, the figure in tlle 
latter is 49%; again, for contrast, the figure in the United States is 27%. It must be 
recognized that there are real costs in terms of attention, political capital, and 
energy for civilians in seeking to achieve this control in terms of (re)negotiating 
prerogatives, creating institutions, and creating positions for informed and 
professional civilians. Civilian politicians in all but a very few countries are not 
willing to assume tllese costs. 34 In short, in the vast majority of new democracies, 
achieving real democratic civilian control of the armed forces is still very much a 
work in progress. With a large gap between the experience, and expectations, of 
the United States in this key area of democratic civilian control of the armed 
forces, it will be a challenge for anyone with responsibility for building partner 
capacity to deal with the many apparently similar but very different realities. 
There is simply not the fabric or tissue with which the United States in its efforts 
to 'build partner capacity' can relate to civilians and civilian-led institutions. 
Instead, lacking this fabric or tissue, and with civilian control shaky in any case, 
the United States in its efforts to build partner capacity tends to link with the 
armed forces, thereby strengthening them relative to the civilians.35 
Developing national security and defense strategies 
While democratic civilian control is not at issue in the United States, what is at 
issue is strategy. And, since developing and implementing national security and 
defense strategies is part of building partner capacity, this is a relevant topic in 
this article. 
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In the United States, and formalized in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, there is an explicit legal requirement that the 
executive annually publish a National Security Strategy (NSS). However, once the 
rationale of the Cold War disappeared, the urgency, and the political implications 
of publishing a NSS changed radically. Between 1987 and 2000 an NSS was 
submitted every year except in 1989 and 1992. During the eight years of the George 
W. Bush administration there were two, and so far, in the five years of the Obama 
administration there has been one with another promised later this year.36 
Following in the tradition of Clausewitz, there are several brilliant and 
exciting books on strategy. That is, there is a great intellectual basis for 
developing strategies. In my view, the gold standard in defining strategy and 
civil-military relations is summarized in the following short quote by the British 
expert on strategy and military history, Hew Strachan. 
In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out 
his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. 
The reality is that this process - a process called strategy - is iterative, a dialogue 
where ends also reflect means and where the result - also called strategy - is a 
compromise between the end of policy and the military means available to 
implement it. 37 
The comments of Robert Gates, on accepting the offer of the position of 
Secretary of Defense by President Bush in October 2006, are telling: 'Personally, 
I don't recall ever reading the president's NSS when preparing to become 
secretary of defense. Nor did I read any of the previous National Defense Strategy 
documents when I became secretary. I never felt disadvantaged by not having 
read these scriptures.' 38 And, it is abundantly clear from reading the books of 
both Baker and Gates, that there was no political strategy in fighting the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. As Strachan states with regard to the United States: 
'Arguably, strategy has been absent throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In part this is because the political objects have been unclear, or variable, or 
defined in terms too broad to be deliverable in strategic terms. Because there has 
been no clear relationship between the ends and the limited (and often 
inappropriate) means, strategy is simply not possible.' 39 
There are, I believe, three main reasons for the lack of 'real', which here means 
implemented or better implementable, national security and defense strategies in 
the United States. Two reasons for the lack of strategy have been well analyzed by 
Robert Jervis in an article, entitled appropriately enough 'U.S. Grand Strategy: 
Mission Impossible' where he emphasizes the following. 4° First, the absence of an 
existential threat now that the USSR is gone. As Jervis states: ' ... it will not be 
possible for the United States to develop and follow a coherent grand strategy over 
the next decade or so. Fortunately, one is not needed, although its absence will 
annoy scholars, confuse other countries, and make military planning extremely 
difficult.' 41 Second, the great difficulty of developing a strategy, grand or not, in a 
pluralistic political system subject to the give and take of multiple and competing 
interests. Third, and closely related to the latter point, which is more specific, if an 
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elected official, a president or prime minister, develops a strategy that is in any way 
specific as to implementation and measurement, he or she will be extremely 
vulnerable politically if the goals are not achieved; and, as all observers from 
Clausewitz to Churchill to Gates note, war, and security matters short of war, are 
unpredictable.42 This author's question is, then, along the same lines of Finer's 
quote above regarding democratic civilian control, not why countries are loath to 
develop national security and defense strategies, but why any country would? It 
requires a huge amount of agreement, consensus, across the whole political 
spectrum on the issues that might be included in such a strategy. 
If developing strategy is difficult, if not impossible, in the United States, what 
role can the United States play in building partner capacity regarding strategies? 
My reading of the GAO report by Janet A. St Laurent, Managing Director 
Defense Capabilities and Management, emphasizes three main categories of 'best 
practices' .43 They are: setting clear goals and defining terminology; coordinating 
activities and sharing information; and sustaining efforts and evaluating progress. 
These three together are equivalent to saying, at least for me, that there is no 
strategy, not even in promoting building partner capacity. 
That the lack of strategy is important can be seen with reference to the private 
security companies (PSCs, also called private military companies). The lack of a 
strategy is highlighted by what Robert Gates has to say about the rise of the PS Cs. 
According to Gates, 'As the contractor presence developed in Iraq after the 
original invasion, there was no plan, no structure, no oversight, and no 
coordination. The contractors' role grew willy-nilly as each US department or 
agency contracted with them independently, their number eventually climbing to 
some 150,000. Out of some 7,300 security contractors Defense hired, nearly 
6,000 did some kind of stationary guard duty'. The State Department, however, 
hired a large number to provide convoy security for diplomats, other government 
officials, special visitors, and some other civilians, and it was those hires that 
caused most of our headaches. '44 That is, 'no plan, no structure, no oversight, and 
no coordination= no strategy'. 'The contractors' role grew willy-nilly ... ' Willy-
nilly is another way of saying without a plan; without a strategy. This is important 
as the numbers displayed in Table 1 demonstrate that there were almost as many 
contractors as uniformed personnel in Iraq.45 
In my research and writing on the use of PSCs, mainly in Iraq, all of the 
central points I make that resulted in the large numbers and negative impact of the 
PSCs - lack of service doctrine, lack of coordinating institutions, lack of 
integration with the uniformed services, and lack of mechanisms for controlling 
the PSCs - can be explained by the lack of strategy.46 However, to avoid the 
criticism of using self-serving arguments based on my own writings, I can draw 
on the Final Report to Congress of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, 
Reducing Risks of August 2011. The Commission was specifically created by 
Congress to study the issue and make recommendations. In the 'Executive 
summary' after stating that 'at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60 
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Table 1. Presence of contractor personnel during US military operations. 
Estimated personnel 
Estimated ratio (thousands) 
of contractor to 
Conflict Contractora Military military personnel" 
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6 
War of 1812 n/a 38 n/a 
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6 
Civil War 200 1000 1 to 5 
Spanish-American War n/a 35 n/a 
World War I 85 2000 1 to 24 
World War II 734 5400 1 to 7 
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5 
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5 
Gulf War 9b 500 1 to 55b 
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1 
Iraq Theater as of early 2008c 190 200 1 to 1 
Source: Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 'Contractors' Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq', based 
on data from Epley, 'Civilian Support of Field Armies'; Zamparelli, 'Contractors on the Battlefield'; 
Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting, 12. 
Notes: n/a = not available. 
•For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed by the 
US government. However, because most civilians present during military operations are contractor 
personnel, the inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the calculated ratio of 
contractor personnel to military personnel. 
b The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during 
Operations 'Desert Shield' and 'Desert Storm'. Personnel associated with those provisions are not 
included in the data or the ratio. 
c For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of the 
Iraq theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
billion, has been lost to contract waste and fraud in America's contingency 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan',47 the Commission offers 15 recommen-
dations for remedying the problem. Virtually all of these would be obviated if 
there were a strategy; if the United States had in fact followed a strategy in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.48 
Evidence of a lack of national security or defense strategy regarding the PSCs 
is provided not only from the analysis in my book and the recommendations of 
the Commission, but also by what is not included in accounts of principal players 
in the war or wars. The books of three very well-respected journalists are 
particularly useful in this regard. First, Suzanne Simons builds her book, Master 
of War: Blackwater USA 's Erik Prince and the Business of War, on over 
100 hours of interviews with Blackwater founder and CEO Erik Prince and her 
access to Blackwater' s top offices and facilities over 18 months.49 Simons 
repeatedly notes a total lack of coordination between one of the largest PSCs in 
Iraq and the military commanders who were responsible for pursuing US goals in 
Iraq. Second is Linda Robinson's Tell Me How This Ends: General David 
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Petraeus and the Search for a Way out of Iraq. Her focus is on the development 
and execution of the US military campaign termed the 'surge' that took place in 
2007-2008 to end the escalating internecine violence that had spread across Iraq. 
In 363 pages of text she makes perhaps a half-dozen brief references to PSCs, but 
none are mentioned in the list 'Principal Cast of Characters (as of February 
2007)', or in the extensive acknowledgements. Third, in Peter Baker's Days of 
Fire, which focuses on the White House and the war in Iraq, there is a brief 
mention of Blackwater and the death of four of their contractors in Fallujah, but 
nothing beyond, nor in the Index is there any reference to private security or 
private military contractors. This is at a time when the CBO report of August 
2008 that is displayed above puts the ratio of contractors to military personnel at 
about one-to-one. In short, the reliance on PSCs was not integrated into any plan, 
or strategy. Based on the very negative experience of the United States in the two 
most recent wars, with specific evidence from the rise of the PSCs, any objective 
observer must question the ability of the United States to build capacity 
elsewhere to develop and implement strategy, even in the unlikely event that the 
democratically elected civilian elites had the incentive to do so. 
Conclusion 
While democratic civilian control is not at issue in the United States, it is very 
much so in most of the newer democracies. In the latter, they are still in the 
preliminary stages of developing and staffing institutions, and inculcating, in 
both the armed forces and among civilians, a culture that assumes civilian 
control as both normal and desirable. To think that the unique experience and 
model of the United States in civil-military relations can be duplicated 
elsewhere is misleading and short-sighted. One cannot assume the civilian 
decision-makers are in fact decision-makers in the areas of national security 
and defense, that they are interested in being partners with the United States, or 
that they have any incentives to deal with the armed forces beyond keeping 
them from staging coups. As a key element of building partner capacity must 
include developing and implementing strategy, the United States has 
demonstrated that it has not been successful since the end of the Cold War. 
In addition to evidence of a lack of strategy in the poor results of the wars, the 
author specifically focuses on the rise of the PSCs as a manifestation of the lack 
of a strategy. At a minimum, the evidence and argument in this article should 
encourage civilian officials and military officers in the United States to think 
through the implications of using the mantra of building partner capacity as a 
justification for security assistance. 
Disclaimer 
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not necessarily 
represent the views of either the US Navy or the Department of Defense. 
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data on the very high regard of the general population for the military, Pew Research 
Religion & Public Life Project, 11 July 2013. 
13. Baker, Days of Fire, 521. Baker was White House correspondent for the New York 
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administrations. 
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Force, Wynne, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Moseley, due to errors 
regarding the handling of nuclear weapons (Duty, 243). 
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18. For the percentage of the population in the military see Pew, The Military-Civilian 
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19. If the point regarding unambiguous civilian control in the United States is so obvious 
why am I going into such detail on it? It is necessary as there is a body of literature in 
the United States that begins with the assumption that civilian control is challenged, 
is an ongoing issue. This is dealt with under the term of 'normal' theory in Cohen, 
Supreme Command, 'Appendix', 225-48. 
20. Finer, The Man on Horseback, 5. 
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